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Book Reviews
INERPETATION OF AGREEmETs AND WowRD PUBLIc ORDER. By Myres
S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and James C. Miller. New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. xxi, 410. $9.75.
In a divisive world community, where technological progress has
brought intensive inter-nation contact, where conditions beyond the
control of any one nation pervade, and where special interests and now
perspectives shatter the old common ground of customary international
law, it needs no emphasis that international agreements have taken on
new significance. Treaties' have become the normal form of inter-
national legislation-creating the minimum expectations of stability of
the world public order system, establishing the world constitutive pro-
cess,2 and allowing participants in the international system, ranging
from the nation to the individual, to pursue their value objectives:
welfare, wealth, respect, rectitude, intelligence, skill, power, and
affection.3
The premise of Interpretation of Agreements and World Public
Order is that, conceding the significance of treaties to minimum world
public order (peace) and the shaping and sharing of all values, the
contemporary confusion about the decision-maker's role in interpreta-
tion is extremely hazardous. This is especially so because the growth
of public order demands confidence in the competence and integrity
of the decision-process (a confidence which may not now be justified).
Thus the book has two tasks. It is to demonstrate that past decision-
makers have spawned confusion and oversimplification, and it is to
postulate a framework of intelligent inquiry for the tasks of interpreta-
tion. Eminently, the book succeeds.
The policy-oriented approach of Professors McDougal and Las-
swell is today well-known and variously received, but is little under-
' This writer, like the authors of INTERPxrrATON OF AGErENTs AND
WonrD PUBLIC Ouma, sees no reason to confine this or synonomous terms to agree-
ments between nation-states or governments, but would include all agreements by
all participants in the world processes.2 This is a public order system wherein authoritative decision institutions have
come into effect and which in turn are protected and extended while promoting
the shaping and sharing of values. A full exploration is presented in McDougal,
Lasswefl & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19
J. LEGAL ED. 253, 403 (1967).3 This breaking down of the objectives of participants is based on convenience
and the appreciation of these qualities as values. For a brief summary of the
content and practicality of these values see Id. at 268-75.
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stood. Building on their previous suggestions for useful inquiry,4 they,
with Miller, now explore another area of the international control sys-
tem.5 First, the relevant processes are isolated: the process of agree-
ment," the process of claims,7 and the process of authoritative decision.8
Then, sequentially, these processes are empirically examined by
"phases,"9 resulting in ordered identification of the surrounding context.
Finally, to overcome the usual ambiguity of what is meant by the
particular law in question, the authors confront the reader with the
four intellectual tasks of problem solving: postulation of preferred
policies; analysis of the trend of decision; a search for explanatory
factors; and recommendations for future manipulation.
Contextuality becomes the key to interpretation. The basic demand
of the authors is that, in filfilling the expectations of the parties to
an agreement, a decision-maker must refer to all the surrounding cir-
cumstances-those before the agreement (pre-outcome), the agree-
ment (outcome) and those after the agreement (post-outcome). This is
demanded since interpretation of treaties is a problem of communica-
tion just as it is for constitutions, statutes, precedents, custom and
private agreements. All agreements contain ambiguities; all are abstract
and contradictory; all provide decision-makers "opportunities for re-
lating the decisions they make to the basic goal values of preferred
public order."' 0
The goals of interpretation are detailed in three stages: 1. Primary
interpretation demands that "decision-makers undertake a disciplined,
responsible effort to ascertain the genuine shared expectations of the
particular parties to an agreement."'" Respect for individual choice is
deduced directly from the abstract goal of human dignity.
4 See, e.g., McDougal & Lasswell, Legal Education and Public Policy: Pro-
fessional Training in the Public Interest, YALE L.J. (1943). For two recent addi-
tions see McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 1 GEORGIA L. REv. I (1966);
Lasswell & McDougal, Jurisprudence in Policy Oriented Perspective, 19 U. FLA. L.
REv. 486 (1967).
5 Among the previously explored areas are: M. McDouGA., H. LASSWE & I.
Vzsxc, LAw AND PuBLic ORDER IN SPACE (1963); M. McDouGAL & W. BuBEE,
THE Punrac OaDE OF = Oc NSs: A CoNTrsaPoav INTERNA-TONAL LAw OF
TH SEA (1962); and M. McDouGAL & F. FscL_,o, LAw Am MninIUm WoR
PuBLIc OaDm; THE LEGAL EcULAToN OF INTErNATiONAL CoERcIoN (1961).
6 M. McDouGAL, H. LAsswELL & J. MILEP, INTERPRrATioN OF AGREKN rs
Aim WoRLD PuBuc ORDEa 13-20 (1967) [Hereinafter cited as AGREEM E Ts].
7 Id. at 21-26.
8 Id. at 27-34.
9 Phase analysis is a conceptual technique for delineating the relevant aspects
of any interaction. To summarize: Who (participants), with what objectives
(perspectives) and under what conditions (situations), using what means (base
vues) in what ways (strategies) achieve what immediate results (outcomes)
and what long-term impacts (effects)?
10 AGPEmvnms at XI.
11 Id. at 40.
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2. Supplementary interpretation demands that "gaps, contra-
dictions or ambiguities in the parties' communication" should be filled
"by making reference to the basic constitutive policies of the larger
community which embraces both parties and decision-makers."f 2
3. Policing demands that "when grave contradictions are found
between tht explicit expectations of the parties to an agreement and
requirements of fundamental community policy, decision-makers
should refuse to give effect to the expectations of the parties."' 3
The question is, have these goals of interpretation found acceptance
in practice? The primary interpretation goal, the authors find, has been
variously recognized and spasmodically applied, usually in terms of
the "original intent" of the parties, from Vattel to the South-West
Africa Case.14 Yet the goal is constantly threatened in a number of
ways: First, by the reiteration of the "plain meaning rule" to exclude
contextual inquiry; secondly, by those who would posit a fixed
hierarchy of coexisting "rules" of interpretation (the normal textbook
approach); and, lastly, the more contemporaneously and most signi-
ficantly by Article 27 of the International Law Commission's Draft Law
of Treaties, where textuality rather than contextuality rules supreme.'15
The other goals, similarly, while verbally respected, are torn by
clich6, ambiguity and infidelity, with little or no effort to identify
basic community policy.
To navigate the breadth of a full contextual analysis, a detailed
guide is provided. The proposed strategy is to distinguish "principles
of content" (i.e., What should decision-makers think about?) and
"principles of procedure" (i.e., What is the best way to bring relevant
content to view?) "Principles of content are addressed to the choice of
subject matter that is relevant to the alternatives of policy open to a
decision-maker,"-' while principles of procedure guide decision-makers
in arranging the sequence of events.1 Consequently, it is possible to
isolate relevant details of the context by phase analysis of each
analytical unit.
With the proposed policies indicated, the bulk of Interpretation of
Agreements and World Public Order turns to past practice. The
12 1d. at 41.
'3 Id.
'4 (1966) I.C.J. 4.
15 While Article 27 of the Draft, which states that "A treaty shall be inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object andpurose,"
seems to be broader than its predecessor, the emphasis remains on the 'clear
meaning" type of approach. Especially is this the case because of later definitions
such as to the meaning of "context". See 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 263, 271 (1967).
16 AGREEMENTs at 466.
17 Id. at 65.
[Vol. 57,
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authors easily demonstrate that, despite occasional references to a
wider context, there has been a lack of disciplined analysis. Before
adequate reference to pre-outcome events there is the tautologous
hurdle of the "plain meaning rule," and there are those who would
hinder focus on post-outcome events. Indeed, there is little under-
standing of a decision-maker's tasks, a considerable rejection of ex-
panding scientific techniques, and a near-total evading of the creative
opportunities of a decision-maker. The principles of procedure,
especially, remain unappreciated and unused in any coherent fashion.
Practice, in other words, falls short of the acceptable.
This 230 page analysis of the trend incorporates previous insights of
McDougal and Lasswell. The rationale of the complementarity of
principles in legal decision-making is elaborated upon. Using the ap-
parently contradictory principles of "effective interpretation" and
"restrictive interpretation," the authors show that there is no cause for
alarm, because such opposites (if fully appreciated) can guide one to
the factors of total context and assist one in articulation of public
order policies.' 8 Meanwhile, decision-makers should take stock of their
own strengths (base values) and adjust decisions within the bounds of
effectiveness. They "should be modestly hesitant to impose new
policies," especially those contrary to current community expecta-
tions.19 (One wonders if the authors would justify the majority opinion
in the recent South-West Africa Case2° under such reasoning. And if
not, then when?) Further, decision-makers are called upon to be
"explicitly rational" both as to policies and implementation.21 A broad
attack is made upon the common resort to so-called logic by decision-
makers. Using the work of Layman Allen, it is easy to fault the
efusdem generis rule, for example, or to discover ambiguity of syntax
where none was appreciated. 22 In addition, to encourage those who
might dismay at the comprehensive nature of the contextual inquiry
there is the common-sense principle of adjusting effort to importance.23
The final chapter assesses the trend, finding a "remarkable, and in
many respects, lamentable state of affairs, 24 particularly if we limit
the inquiry to what decision-makers say. An appraisal reveals in-
consistency and false claims of consistency, naivety and the facile use
of maxims, and a fundamental misconception of the task of decision-
18 Id. at 156-85.
19 Id. at 265.
20 (1966) L.C.J. 4.
2 1 AtGtiMNTS at 266-67.
22 See especially id. at 330-43.
231d. at 303.
241d. at 360.
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makers who deny themselves a degree of access to pertinent reality.25
Intellectual advances are ignored. The crucial factor of the chaos is
"the failure by decision-maker and publicists to conceive of the agree-
ment making process.., as a process of communication, and to view
this process in its widest extent through the lens of modem com-
munication studies."26 Quickly dismissed is the possibility that all this
confusion is a profound strategy by decision-makers to retain choice
of decision and support for implementation, for the authors cannot
stomach "the image of a galaxy of canny jurists engaged in out-
smarting the rest of the world in the interest of judicial integrity.
7"T
At first reading Interpretation of International Agreements and
World Public Order is rather confusing, with specialized vocabulary
and many general premises harbouring their own ambiguity. Yet the
work is undoubtedly an outstanding contribution going far beyond
the standard works. By focusing only on interpretation and ignoring
other problems relating to treaties, the bulk of the authors' previous
multifactoral efforts is avoided. The writers amply refute charges of un-
necessary prolixity and incomprehensible language by their demand
for constructive, policy-oriented inquiry and by the ease with which
they display the inadequacy of past and present practice. For he who
would move on to contemporary challenges, here is a valuable
manifesto.
William E. Holder
Senior Lecturer in Law
Australian National University
25Id. at 364.
26Id. at 371-72.
.27Id. at 870.
[Vol. 57,
